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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Torrey Friedrich appeals from the judgments of conviction in two cases, one 
involving a DUI charge and the other, a grand theft charge. He asserts that the district 
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence in his DUI case, and that it 
abused its discretion, imposing excessive sentences in both cases. He therefore 
requests that this Court remedy those errors. 
The motion to suppress was based on the fact that the State failed to 
demonstrate that the officer's decision to detain Mr. Friedrich was based on reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Friedrich was engaged in criminal activity. The State tried to argue 
two justifications for the stop. The first, which was the only justification articulated by 
the officer in his report and at the preliminary hearing, was that Mr. Friedrich's car had 
fishtailed on the slick, snow-packed road. However, the district court found that 
Mr. Friedrich was reasonably compensating for the conditions, and that his evidence 
demonstrated that there was no reasonable suspicion for the warrantless detention on 
that ground. The second justification was that the officer knew Mr. Friedrich to be 
driving on a suspended license. However, the officer testified that he was unable to 
determine whether the vehicle he saw was, in fact, the same vehicle for which he was 
looking, or that it was Mr. Friedrich driving the vehicle until after he had initiated the 
detention of that vehicle. 
Based on the facts in the record, neither of those purported justifications actually 
validates the warrantless detention. As such, the warrantless detention violated both 
the United States and Idaho Constitutions, and the evidence discovered thereafter 
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(including all the evidence relied upon in regard to the DUI charge) should have been 
suppressed. 
In regard to the excessive sentences, the district court imposed concurrent 
ten-year unified sentences, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Friedrich for DUI and grand 
theft. It did so without sufficiently considering Idaho's recognized sentencing objectives, 
as it did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors present in the record. As such, 
those sentences are both excessive and constitute abuses of the district court's 
discretion. This Court should remedy those errors. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In regard to the DUI charge, Officer Steve Moore was investigating a driver he 
had been told was driving on a suspended license. (See Tr., p.21, Ls.1-14.) He 
testified that he had been informed during a unit briefing that another officer, Deputy 
Meacham, had attempted to perform a traffic stop on an SUV-type vehicle. (Tr., p.i7, 
Ls.16-i7; p.19, Ls.2-7.) However, Deputy Meacham had to take extra time to turn 
around because of bad road conditions. (Tr., p.17, Ls.17-18.) By the time he had 
relocated the suspect vehicle, the driver had parked it and walked away. (Tr., p.i7, 
Ls.i9-22.) Officers were unable to locate the driver. (Tr., p.17, L.23 - p.i8, L.2.) 
As part of that investigation, officers checked the status of the owner of the vehicle, 
Mr. Friedrich, and determined that he had a suspended driver's license. (Tr., p.18, 
Ls.7-9.) For that reason only, officers were requested to watch the neighborhood 
around Mr. Friedrich's house. (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-9.) 
Officer Moore did as requested on the evening of December 1, 2010, parking on 
the side of the road near Mr. Friedrich's house. (Tr., p.21, L.10 - p.22, L.13.) According 
to the officer, conditions were "snowy and terrible" that night. (Tr., p.39, L.13.) He also 
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testified that the roads were "snow-covered, and it was very slick out." (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.16-17.) As he watched, a vehicle similar to that investigated by Deputy Meacham 
drove down the road toward the officer, though it never got far enough to pass him. 
(Tr., p.30, Ls.1-23.) Officer Moore was not sure whether it was actually the same 
vehicle that Deputy Meacham had investigated. (Tr., p.30, Ls.13-16.) Officer Moore did 
not report the license plate to dispatch to find out if it was the same vehicle. (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.17-21.) Officer Moore did see the vehicle fishtail as it pulled into a driveway, though 
he was not sure which driveway. (Tr., p.30, Ls.7-9; p.22, Ls.23-24.) 
Mr. Friedrich, who, as it turned out, was driving the vehicle, testified that he had 
reduced his speed to five to ten miles an hour, despite a twenty mile per hour speed 
limit. (Tr., p.11, L.18 - p.12, L.1.) He also testified that he felt he could safely navigate 
the roads so long as he did so with precaution. (See Tr., p.12, Ls.10-12.) Despite his 
reasonable cautionary efforts, the vehicle was still affected by the conditions of the road. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.8-11.) Nevertheless, Officer Moore decided to detain the driver of the 
vehicle because the car fishtailed on snowy, slick roads. 1 (Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.82 (Officer Moore's police report); Prelim. Tr., p.10, 
L.24 - p.11, L.7i Therefore, he pulled up behind the car, which had parked in the 
1 Officer Moore's testimony changed between the preliminary hearing and the hearing 
on the motion to suppress. At the preliminary hearing, he testified that the only reason 
he initiated the detention of the driver was because of the fishtailing, but at the hearing 
on the motion to suppress, he added the justification that he knew the driver's license to 
be suspended. (Compare Prelim. Tr., p.10, L.24 - p.11, L.7 with Tr., p.28, Ls.19-23.) 
He also testified that he did not know who was driving the car until he initiated the stop 
and activated his spotlight. (Tr., p.31, Ls.10-14.) 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"FriedrichPSI." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the documents 
attached thereto (police reports, letters of support, etc.). The transcript of the 
preliminary hearing is provided in a separate electronic PDF file, "FriedrichPreTrans." 
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driveway, with his emergency lights activated and "initiated a traffic stop.,,3 (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.22-23, p.35, L.1.) 
Once he had pulled in behind the suspect vehicle, Officer Moore activated his 
spot light and, at that point, recognized the driver as Mr. Friedrich. (PSI, p.82; Tr., p.31, 
Ls.13-14.) Based on the information he received at the unit briefing, Officer Moore 
placed Mr. Friedrich under arrest for driving on a suspended license. (PSI, p.82; 
see Tr., p.32, Ls.6-12.) However, Officer Moore testified, and the State later stipulated 
that, had he run Mr. Friedrich's information in the Idaho database, it would have 
informed the officer that Mr. Friedrich's driving privileges had been restored and 
Mr. Friedrich's license was not suspended. (Tr., p.32, Ls.6-10; R., p.89.) 
Upon placing Mr. Friedrich under arrest, Officer Moore testified that he smelled 
the odor of alcohol on Mr. Friedrich. (PSI, p.82.) He decided that because of the 
conditions, the field sobriety tests could not be reliably performed on site. (Tr., p.37, 
Ls.7-10.) Therefore, he waited to have Mr. Friedrich perform the tests until he had been 
transported to the jail. (PSI, p.82.) Officer Moore's report indicates that Mr. Friedrich 
failed all three tests, although the probable cause form only indicates that he failed two.4 
(Compare PSI, p.82 with PSI, p.33.) A subsequent breathalyzer indicated that 
Mr. Friedrich had a blood alcohol content of 0.09 percent. (PSI, p.35.) One and one-
3 The district court took issue with this phrasing of the event when defense counsel 
subsequently used it during cross examination of the officer. (Tr., p.34, Ls.8-16; see 
a/so Tr., p.41, L.16 - p.42, L.16.) Regardless, as defense counsel pointed out, when the 
officer approached with his emergency lights activated, he seized the driver of the 
vehicle. (Tr., p.42, Ls.15-16.) Officer Moore also testified that he intended to seize the 
driver. (Tr., p.36, Ls.12-25.) 
4 Additionally, of eight potential indicators on the walk and turn test, Mr. Friedrich was 
only presented two, losing his balance just once while the instructions were being given 
and turning in the wrong direction. (PSI, p.35.) He was not lethargic or otherwise 
impaired in his movements, and his speech was not slurred. (PSI, p.35.) 
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half hours after he initiated the detention, Officer Moore checked Mr. Friedrich's driving 
privileges in Oregon and found them to be suspended. (Tr., p.33, L.i5 - p.34, L.7, p.34, 
L.2i.) 
At the hearing on Mr. Friedrich's motion to suppress, the district court made 
several findings of fact. First, "I think 5 to 10 miles an hour is quite a reasonable way to 
handle the snow. He [Mr. Friedrich] had to go to work in the morning, and he has to 
come home in the evening, and I think it's unreasonable to expect that people WOUldn't 
drive at all, and 5 to 10 miles an hour is a very reasonable way to cover the snow-
covered roads." (Tr., p.i4, L.22 - p.15, L.3.) As such, it found that Mr. Friedrich had 
established that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop/detention on 
that basis. (Tr., p.14, Ls.17-19.) It also found that Officer Moore could rely on the unit 
briefing in regard to Mr. Friedrich's license status without rechecking to make sure that 
information was still correct before initiating the warrantless detention. (Tr., pA6, Ls.i3-
17, pA7, Ls.7-13.) Upon confirming that the driver was, in fact, Mr. Friedrich, the district 
court found that the officer could arrest him. (Tr., pA6, L.23 - pA7, L.6.) As such, it 
denied the motion to suppress in that regard. 5 (Tr., pA7, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Friedrich 
subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving those issues for appeal. 
(R., pp.109-10.) 
As the DUI case was proceeding, the State filed a second complaint, charging 
Mr. Friedrich with grand theft by possessing stolen property. (R., pp.131-32.) 
Christopher Novak had reported that several computer devices had been taken from his 
5 Officers had also elicited several statements from Mr. Friedrich regarding the status of 
his license and whether he had consumed alcohol without advising him of his rights 
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Tr., p.37, Ls.11-21; see R., pp.83-87.) 
The district court granted Mr. Friedrich's motion to suppress those statements. 
(Tr., pA8, L.22 - p.49, L. 11.) 
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home and he supplied officers with the serial numbers of the various items. (See, e.g., 
PSI, p.100.) A confidential informant subsequently informed officers that Mr. Friedrich 
had those items and was attempting to sell them. (PSI, p.101-02.) Officers then 
initiated a traffic stop on Mr. Friedrich. (PSI, 102; Tr., p.69, L.19.) They searched his 
car and found several of the stolen devices. (PSI, p.1 02.) Ultimately, he entered a plea 
agreement with the state and admitted he knew the devices were, in fact, stolen when 
they were in his possession. (Tr., p.67, L.22 - p.68, L.20.) 
The plea agreement encompassed both the DUI and the grand theft cases. 
(See Tr., p.58, L.14 - p.59, L.25.) In regard to the DUI case, Mr. Friedrich agreed to 
plead guilty to the DUI charge via a conditional plea and was free to argue as to the 
appropriate sentence, and the State agreed to dismiss the two misdemeanor charges, 
to withdraw the habitual offender enhancement, and to recommend a unified sentence 
of fourteen years, with four years fixed. (Tr., p.58, L.19 - p.59, L.5.) In regard to the 
grand theft charge, Mr. Friedrich agreed to plead guilty and was free to argue as to 
the appropriate sentence, and the State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of 
fourteen years, with four years fixed, concurrent to the sentence imposed in the DUI 
case, and to not file a habitual offender enhancement. (Tr., p.59, Ls.2-3, 16-25.) The 
district court accepted those pleas and set the cases for sentencing. (Tr., p.70, 
Ls.9-18.) 
The presentence investigation report revealed that Mr. Friedrich had a troubled 
childhood due to mental abuse at the hand of his father. (PSI, p.6.) He suffered from 
symptoms of depression throughout his childhood and was currently displaying 
symptoms consistent with Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder. (PSI, pp.20, 24.) And, while Mr. Friedrich did not report any formal 
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diagnoses, he did place in the high range of the Internal Mental Distress Scale. 
(PSI, pp.24-25.) Mr. Friedrich indicated that he had come to understand that these 
issues were playing a role with his drug and alcohol abuse, as he used those 
substances to self-medicate for his depression symptoms. (PSI, p.12.) As such, he 
requested treatment not only for his substance abuse issues, but for his depression 
symptoms as well. (See, e.g., PSI, p.12.) The GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral 
Summary (hereinafter, GRRS) recommended that Mr. Friedrich participate in an 
intensive outpatient treatment program to address these issues. (PSI, p.23.) He also 
received letters of support from several family members, including his mother, fiancee, 
brother, sister-in-law, and cousin. (PSI, pp.14-18.) They, along with the GRRS, 
indicated that a significant change in Mr. Friedrich's life occurred with the birth of 
his son earlier that year. (See PSI, pp.14-18, 21.) And while the PSI indicated that 
Mr. Friedrich should not be considered for probationary release, it did not rule out a 
period of retained jurisdiction as an available option. (See PSI, p.12.) 
At sentencing, defense counsel indicated that Mr. Friedrich did not object to the 
request for restitution associated with the grand theft case. (Tr., p.76, Ls.21-22.) 
Counsel also pointed out that Mr. Friedrich is a trained electrician. (Tr., p.79, Ls.17-20.) 
As such, defense counsel recommended that, despite his criminal history, Mr. Friedrich 
should be afforded the opportunity to rehabilitate via a period of retained jurisdiction, 
particularly given his current insights and amenability to treatment. (Tr., p.76, L.13 -
p.82, L.9.) Mr. Friedrich himself expressed his remorse and accepted responsibility for 
his actions. (Tr., p.82, Ls.11-14, p.84, Ls.5-7.) He also expressed his continuing desire 
to get treatment and rehabilitate himself, so as to be a good father for his newborn son. 
(See, e.g., Tr., p.83, L.16 - p.84, L.7.) Despite these factors, the district court imposed a 
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unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, in each case and ordered those 
sentences to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.90, Ls.11-15; R., pp.123-24, 167-68.) 
Mr. Friedrich filed timely notices of appeal in each case. 6 (R., pp.119-21, 164-66.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court consolidated those appeals. (Order, dated December 16, 
2011. ) 
6 He also filed motions for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35, which were denied. 
(See Augmentation to the Record.) Those motions are not challenged on appeal. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Friedrich's motion to suppress 
because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the warrantless 
detention of Mr. Friedrich. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Friedrich's Motion To 
Suppress Because The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To 
Justify The Warrantless Detention Of Mr. Friedrich 
A. Introduction 
The district court erroneously denied Mr. Friedrich's motion to suppress the 
evidenced gained as a result of Officer Moore's detention of Mr. Friedrich. Because that 
detention was not based on reasonable suspicion, it violated Mr. Friedrich's Fourth 
Amendment rights, as well as his rights pursuant to Article I, § 17 of Idaho Constitution. 
The only justification the officer provided in his report and in his testimony at the 
preliminary hearing (the fishtailing of the vehicle) did not provide reasonable suspicion 
because that event was caused by the road conditions and the district court found that 
Mr. Friedrich was driving reasonably given those conditions. As such, that observation 
did not provide reasonable suspicion that Mr. Friedrich was driving contrary to the traffic 
laws, and thus, did not provide a basis to initiate a warrantless detention of the driver. 
The other justification the State subsequently proffered (the information regarding 
Mr. Friedrich's license status) also failed to provide reasonable suspicion. Officer 
Moore admitted that he could not determine whether the vehicle was the same vehicle 
for which he was watching, nor could he determine who was driving that vehicle, until 
after he initiated the warrantless detention. As such, at or before the time he initiated 
the detention, he had no information upon which he could base a reasonable suspicion 
that this driver was driving contrary to the law, and thus, had no reasonable suspicion 
upon which to justify a warrantless detention of that driver. 
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As neither of the forwarded justifications actually validates the warrantless 
detention, that detention was prohibited by the state and federal constitutions and the 
evidence subsequently gained during that detention should have been suppressed. 
The district court erred by not suppressing that evidence. This Court should remedy 
that error and reverse that decision. 
B. Standard Of Review And Overarching Principles 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen reviewing a motion to suppress, 
the standard of review is bifurcated. This Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous. This Court freely reviews the trial court's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482,485-86 (2009) (citations omitted). 
In this case, the motion to suppress invoked the constitutional protections against 
unreasonable seizures. (R., pp.80-81.) The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides 
its own, similar protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. 
Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001). 
In order to effectuate a reasonable warrantless seizure of a person, the officer 
must have at least reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person has violated the 
law. See, e.g., Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 490. Whether or not an officer had reasonable 
suspicion is determined based on the information known to the officer at or before he 
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initiated the warrantless detention. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009). If the 
detention is not supported by reasonable suspicion, the information and observations 
which occur during that detention are considered fruits of the poisonous tree, and thus 
need to be suppressed. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 
(1963) (holding that the exclusionary rule extends to the indirect products of an illegal 
seizure); State v. Salinas, 134 Idaho 362, 366 (Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing the same); 
see also State v. Allgood, 98 Idaho 525, 527 (1977) (holding that the detention must be 
lawful for subsequently-observed evidence to be admissible); State v. Limberhand, 117 
Idaho 456, 461 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that if the officer's initial actions violate the 
Fourth Amendment's protections, his testimony as to his subsequent observations are 
inadmissible). The defendant's burden is only to show a causal connection between the 
illegal seizure and the evidence or testimony sought to be suppressed. State v. Babb, 
136 Idaho 95, 98 (Ct. App. 2001). Once the defendant demonstrates the connection 
between the taint and the suppressible evidence, the burden shifts to the government to 
prove that the taint should not extend to that evidence. Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165,183 (1969); Babb, 136 Idaho at 98. 
In this case, Officer Moore seized Mr. Friedrich when he activated his overhead 
lights. See, e.g., State v. Mireless, 133 Idaho 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
I.C. § 49-1404, which prohibits fleeing or eluding an officer when signaled to stop via the 
officer's emergency lights). It does not matter whether this was a "traffic" stop, as this 
analysis applies equally to vehicles and pedestrians. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 
52 (1979) (requiring at least reasonable suspicion for an officer to detain a pedestrian); 
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 845 (2004) (recognizing the same). Furthermore, 
Mr. Friedrich met his burden, demonstrating that, but for the illegal detention, the officer 
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would not have uncovered the evidence Mr. Friedrich sought to suppress. (See 
R., pp.83-87.) However, as will be discussed infra, the State did not demonstrate that 
the warrantless detention was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the 
information known to the officer at the time he initiated the detention. See Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 811. As such, because the warrantless detention was not justified by 
reasonable suspicion, the evidence resulting from that illegal detention should have 
been suppressed. See, e.g., Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484; Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 
461. 
C. The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Mr. Friedrich Based 
On The Observed Fishtailing Of Mr. Friedrich's Car Because The Officer Could 
Not Determine That Driving Pattern Was Not Caused By The Road Conditions 
And The District Court Found That Mr. Friedrich Was Driving Reasonably Given 
Those Conditions 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "[a] reasonable suspicion exists when 
the officer-or officers-can articulate specific facts which, together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably justify a suspicion that criminal activity is 
occurring." See State v. Danney, _ Idaho _, 283 P.3d 722, 726-27 (2012) 
(emphasis added). The test for reckless driving is objective, and so it does not matter 
whether or not Officer Moore believed that the car was being driven recklessly. (See 
Tr., p.24, Ls.10-13.) Rather, the criminal activity can only occur if the car was being 
driven in an objectively unreasonable manner. See I.C. § 49-1401 (to be driving 
recklessly, the driver must be driving "carelessly and heedlessly or without due caution 
and circumspection ... "). 
Mr. Friedrich testified that, even though the speed limit on that particular section 
of road was twenty miles per hour, he was only driving five to ten miles per hour. 
(Tr., p.11, L.23 - p.12, L.1, p.12, L.25 - p.13, L.5.) However, the roads were not 
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impassible; they just needed to be navigated with reasonable care, which Mr. Friedrich 
was doing. Nevertheless, he testified that the conditions were affecting his vehicle. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.8-11.) Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, the district 
court found "5 to 10 miles an hour is quite a reasonable way to handle the snow. He 
[Mr. Friedrich] had to go to work in the morning, and he has to come home in the 
evening, and I think it's unreasonable to expect that people wouldn't drive at all, and 5 
to 10 miles an hour is a very reasonable way to cover the snow-covered road." 
(Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.3.) The district court also found this evidence sufficient to 
sustain the motion to suppress (absent the State's presentation of evidence) as it 
established a lack of probable cause for the stop based on reckless driving. (Tr., p.14, 
Ls.14-20.) Therefore, based on the district court's findings, the seizure of Mr. Friedrich 
could not be reasonably based on the fishtailing of the vehicle. See Danney, 283 P.3d 
at 726-27. 
Based on the district court's findings, Officer Moore did not have reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Friedrich was driving his car in contravention of the traffic laws when 
he observed it fishtail. Id. The district court made the finding that Mr. Friedrich was 
driving in an objectively reasonable manner, with due caution and circumspection. 
(See Tr., p.14, Ls.22 - p.15, L.3.) Therefore, the fact that the car fishtailed, based on 
the facts in this case, does not lead to a reasonable conclusion that the car was being 
driven recklessly or otherwise contrary to the law. As such, that event did not provide 
Officer Moore with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring, and thus, 
could not justify the warrantless detention. See, e.g., Danney, 283 P.3d at 726-27. 
As such, the warrantless detention was invalid and all subsequently-gathered evidence 
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and testimony thereto, should have been suppressed. See, e.g., Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 
at 484; Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 461. 
D. The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion, Even With The Information 
From The Unit Briefing, When He Initiated The Stop Because He Had Not 
Identified Either The Vehicle Or The Driver, And So Could Not Have Known At 
The Time He Initiated The Warrantless Detention Whether That Person Had A 
Valid License 
Because the officer did not premise the detention of Mr. Friedrich on the status of 
his driver's license, it should not be considered as a potential basis upon which to justify 
the stop. Assuming, however, such a rationale is properly considered, it could not 
provide the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure because Officer Moore 
failed to confirm that the vehicle he observed that night was, in fact, the vehicle for 
which he was watching or that it was being driven by the person for whom he was 
waiting before initiating the warrantless detention. 
An officer must have reasonable suspicion based on the information known to 
him at or before the moment he initiated the warrantless detention. See Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 812. Officers cannot garner reasonable suspicion from hunches, instinct, 
speculation, or lucky guesses. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 16 
(1989) (holding "[f]or law enforcement officers to base a search, even in part, on a "pop" 
guess ... stretches the concept of reasonable suspicion beyond recognition ... "). 
The evidence in this case shows Officer Moore did not have any information at or 
before the time he initiated the warrantless detention that would give him reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the driver of a random vehicle was not properly licensed. 
See, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812. Officer Moore admitted that he could not identify 
the vehicle by sight as the one for which he was looking. (Tr., p.30, Ls.6-12.) The 
vehicle did not pass him on the road. (Tr., p.30, Ls.22-23.) The conditions were "snowy 
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and terrible." (Tr., p.39, L.13.) And, despite his inability to identify the vehicle, he did 
not ask dispatch to check to the license plates on that vehicle to determine if it was, in 
fact, the same vehicle, or a different vehicle merely similar in appearance. (See 
Tr., p.30, Ls.10-12, 17-21.) Officer Moore also admitted that he was not sure who it was 
driving the vehicle until he pulled up to Mr. Friedrich with his emergency lights activated 
and his spotlight trained on the vehicle. 7 (Tr., p.23, Ls.7-10, p.35, L.1, p.46, L.24 - p.47, 
L.2.) In fact, he wrote in his report that it was only after he initiated the detention of 
Mr. Friedrich that he recognized the driver of the vehicle. (See PSI, p.82.) Therefore, 
Officer Moore could not have reasonably based his decision to detain the driver of the 
vehicle based on knowledge that the driver had a suspended license - he did not know 
who the driver was until after initiating the detention of that person. 
Therefore, the warrantless detention was illegal and violated the both the Idaho 
and the United States Constitutions. See, e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 16; Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 812. As a result, the evidence resulting from that illegal warrantless detention 
should have been suppressed, and this Court should reverse the district court's decision 
to the contrary. See, e.g., Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484; Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 461. 
7 Activating the emergency lights initiated the detention. Mireless, 133 Idaho at 692. 
Officer Moore testified that when he pulled in behind the car, he had already activated 
his emergency lights. (Tr., p.35, Ls.1-4.) Therefore, he initiated the stop before he had 
an opportunity to identify the vehicle or driver. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive 
Sentences On Mr. Friedrich In The Two Cases On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Both of the sentences imposed on Mr. Friedrich in these cases were excessive 
because the district court imposed both sentences without sufficiently considering the 
recognized sentencing objectives or the mitigating factors present in this case. As such, 
the district court abused its discretion. This Court should remedy that abuse. 
B. Both Of The Imposed Sentences Are Excessive Because They Were Imposed 
Without Sufficient Consideration Of The Mitigating Factors Present In This Case 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 
1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Friedrich does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing 
objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary objective the court should 
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consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that 
protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered 
reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because 
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, 
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521. 
There are several factors that the appellate court should consider to determine 
whether the objectives are served by a particular sentence. State v. Knighton, 143 
Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good 
character, status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and 
amenability to treatment, and support of family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these 
factors has been the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., 
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 
209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348,354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on 
other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 
(1982). In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted Mr. Friedrich's sentence, and, as a result, 
the sentence does not serve the objectives, and is excessive. 
First, Mr. Friedrich had a troubled childhood, suffering mental abuse at the hands 
of his father. (PSI, p.6.) That is a factor that should be considered in mitigation. 
See State v. Williamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Not surprisingly, he has 
been dealing with depression, though unreported, since he was five years old. 
(PSI, p.20.) His current symptoms are consistent with Major Depressive Disorder and 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Mr. Friedrich rates in the high range of internal 
mental distress. (PSI, pp.24-25.) Mr. Friedrich indicated that he realizes he has been 
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self-medicating for these issues with drugs and alcohol. (PSI, p.9.) As such, he has 
requested to participate in treatment for the depression as well as the substance abuse 
to help address all the issues, which would give him a better chance to successfully 
rehabilitate. (PSI, pp.12, 26.) Therefore, Mr. Friedrich's mental health issues, as well 
as his amenability to treatment should have also weighed in mitigation at sentencing. 
See, e.g., Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). In order to most effectively 
address these issues, the GRRS recommended that Mr. Friedrich participate in 
intensive outpatient treatment. (PSI, p.23.) 
Mr. Friedrich expressed sincere remorse and accepted responsibility for his 
actions. (Tr., p.82, Ls.12-13, p.84, Ls.5-7.) Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of 
responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See Kellis, 
148 Idaho at 815. By making these two acknowledgements, Mr. Friedrich demonstrated 
that he has taken these critical first steps. Additionally, the timing of such rehabilitation 
and treatment is important. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); State v. Nice, 
103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 
639 (Ct. App. 1988). Additionally, sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force 
the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has 
decreased the risk of recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639. 
Imposing extensive sentences without providing rehabilitative opportunities operates 
against these requirements, and therefore, demonstrate the abuse of the district court's 
discretion. He was also willing to pay the requested restitution (see Tr., p.76, Ls.21-22), 
another factor which indicated a more lenient sentence was appropriate. State v. Hall, 
114 Idaho 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1988). And while Mr. Friedrich does have a criminal 
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record (PSI, pp.3-6), even the habitual offender will not be subjected to an excessive 
sentence. Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55. 
Furthermore, Mr. Friedrich received several letters of support from various family 
members. (PSI, pp.14-18.) Family constitutes an important part of a support network, 
which can help in rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,817 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not 
equate to familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the 
support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of 
consideration). As such, those letters should have also weighed in favor of a more 
lenient sentence. Additionally, as the GRRS indicated, the birth of his son within the 
past year is a factor which the district court needed to sufficiently consider. (PSI, p.21.) 
He also has employable skills, as he is trained, for example, as an electrician. 
(Tr., p.79, Ls.17-20.) 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient sentence, 
one which considers rehabilitation, still addresses all the other objectives - protection of 
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993) 
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a 
sentencing court retains jurisdiction, it still imposes and executes a sentence. 
Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still 
present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how 
even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and 
how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). Such a sentence would 
punish Mr. Friedrich by depriving him not only of his liberty during his period of retained 
jurisdiction, but several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm) as well, 
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since this is a felony offense. These results, along with the imposed sentence, would 
also serve as a deterrent to society at large. See id. Furthermore, it would deter 
Mr. Friedrich specifically because the sentence need not be suspended should he 
perform poorly or otherwise violate the terms of the rider. Even if he were to complete 
the rider and be placed on probation, the looming sentence would still deter him from 
violating his probation. 
In this case, the district court would not lose anything in terms of protection of 
society, deterrence, or punishment by retaining jurisdiction. Society would have 
received equally similar protection by retaining jurisdiction as it would by incarcerating 
him. Mr. Friedrich would be in the custody of the Department of Correction either way. 
He could not harm society during that period, so society would be protected whether he 
was on a rider or in prison. Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to 
relinquish jurisdiction and leave Mr. Friedrich incarcerated for the entire fixed term of the 
sentence if he does not show progress. And if the district court did that, the parole 
board would have broad discretion over whether to release him on parole during the 
indeterminate term of his sentence. See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 
(2005). However, the district court could relinquish jurisdiction and enforce the prison 
sentence knowing that all the sentencing objectives were properly addressed. 
What the rider would provide that a term sentence does not is the opportunity to 
rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted, rehabilitation is more likely now than 
in the future. See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Therefore, because it did not sufficiently 
consider the mitigating factors, and thus, the sentencing objectives, the district court 
abused its discretion when it imposed the sentences in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Friedrich respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
decision to deny his motion to suppress and remand that case for further proceedings. 
Otherwise, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems 
appropriate, or alternatively, vacate those sentences and remand to the district court for 
a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this th day of November, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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